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In a pioneering paper on the revenue-complexity hypothesis, Heyndels and Smolders (1995) 
demonstrate that the conventional employment of the Hirschman-Herfindal index (HHC) in the empirical 
analysis of fiscal illusion introduces an arbitrary restriction without theoretical foundation. They 
propose instead the more general Hannah and Kay index (HK). In this paper we extend this approach to 
1991 data drawn from forty six local government areas in Tasmania, Australia. Our results are in broad 
agreement with those produced by Heyndels and Smolders using local government data from Flanders, 
Belgium. We find that the HHC may involve sizeable misspecification bias and our results provide 
further support for the use of HK instead of HHC. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Revenue-complexity, sometimes termed tax complexity, has long been identified as one 
of five potential sources of the systematic misperception of fiscal parameters, otherwise 
known as fiscal illusion.1 The essence of the revenue-complexity hypothesis has been 
described by Wallace Oates (1988, p. 69) as “… the more complicated the revenue 
system, the more difficult it is for the taxpayer to determine the tax-price of public 
outputs - and the more likely it is that he will underestimate the tax-burden associated 
with public programs”. Tax complexity itself is viewed as arising from two separate 
influences; namely, the dispersion or fragmentation of total tax revenue over different 
types of taxation, and the visibility of individual taxes. The empirical analysis of the 
revenue-complexity hypothesis naturally required some measure or proxy for the 
degree of tax complexity associated with a given fiscal jurisdiction. Since Wagner’s 
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(1976) seminal study borrowed the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index (HHC) 
from industrial organisation to represent tax complexity, all subsequent empirical 
investigations of the revenue-complexity hypothesis have also used the HHC. 
In a recent paper Heyndels and Smolders (1995) examine the theoretical arguments 
underlying the tax complexity hypothesis and in particular question the appropriateness 
of employing the HHC as a suitable measure of revenue complexity. The essence of 
their objections to the HHC is as follows (Heyndels and Smolders 1995, pp. 130-131):  
As such, the HHC corresponds to the general ideal of Wagner’s “abstraction 
argument” concerning the impact of size inequalities on fiscal 
misconception. Still, whatever the (theoretical) explanation given to the 
exact nature of this impact, it is hard to put forward a given relation 
between both determinants (number and size inequalities) that is based on 
theoretical grounds. This however is exactly what is being done by using 
the HHC in empirical research. In other words: the impact of the number of 
taxes on the one hand and of size inequalities between the different items on 
the other is theoretically plausible. However, by putting forward a given 
relationship between those two determinants, the choice of the HHC 
introduces a restriction into the model that has hardly any theoretical 
foundation and above all can be circumvented easily. 
In place of the conventional HHC, Heyndels and Smolders (1995) propose a more 
general approach to the measurement of tax complexity which enables the relative 
importance of the number of taxes and size inequalities between different taxes to be 
determined empirically. This is accomplished by means of a Hannah and Kay 
concentration index (HK), which is a more general measure of concentration than the 
HHC. 
In order to evaluate the statistical impact of substituting HK for HHC, Heyndels and 
Smolders (1995) employed a modified version of their model developed in Heyndels 
and Smolders (1994) using 1990 data drawn from 302 municipalities in the Region of 
Flanders in Belgium. After examining the results of the estimation procedure, Heyndels 
and Smolders (1995, pp. 138) draw the following conclusion:  
Our empirical results show that per capita expenditures of Flemish 
municipalities can be explained by a model in which tax complexity is 
measured by a Hannah and Kay index with an α-value of 0.9. Use of the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index would overestimate the relative importance of 
the size inequalities, while underestimating the impact of the number of 
taxes. 
In this paper we seek to extend the novel approach to the issue of tax complexity 
developed by Heyndels and Smolders (1995), and subject it to empirical investigation 
using cross-sectional variables taken from forty six local government areas in the state 
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of Tasmania, Australia, in 1991.2 Our results suggest that the use of HHC simplicity 
indexes in the empirical estimation of the revenue complexity hypothesis may involve 
sizeable misspecification bias. This accords with the central findings of Heyndels and 
Smolders (1995). 
The paper itself is divided into four main areas. Section 2 provides a brief synopsis 
of the characteristics of the HHC and its relationship to the HK. Section 3 deals with 
the empirical methodology employed in the paper, and the results are discussed in 
Section 4. The paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
II. MEASURING TAX COMPLEXITY 
The well-known HHC is given by the following formula:  
 HHC i
i
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=
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1
  (1) 
where Ti represents the proportion of total tax revenue in a given fiscal jurisdiction 
derived from tax i and N represents the number of different taxes. In effect, the HHC 
considers all taxes but, by squaring the relative shares of individual taxes, gives more 
weight to those individual taxes which generate relatively more tax revenue. In the 
limiting base, if only one tax raised all tax revenue, then HHC would take the value of 
unity. Alternatively, if an infinitely large number of taxes generated total tax revenue, 
then the value of the HHC would approach zero. Accordingly, the HHC is a measure of 
the simplicity of a tax regime, with lower values of the index indicating more 
fragmentation. The revenue complexity hypothesis is thus predicted on a negative 
coefficient for the HHC. 
A more general way of determining the relative importance of the number of taxes in 
comparison with revenue raised by individual taxes suggested by Heyndels and 
Smolders (1995) is the HK. The HK can be written as :  
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where α represents a measure of the relative weighting attached to the number of 
different taxes and the size inequalities between different taxes. Heyndels and Smolders 
(1995, p. 131) outline a number of characteristics of the HK which serve to highlight its 
generality. For instance, when α is set equal to 2, the HK becomes the reciprocal of the 
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HHC. Similarly, when α = 0, the HK corresponds to the inverse of the minimum 
concentration index; when α = 1, the logarithm of HK becomes the entropy index; and 
when α = ∞, HK represents the reciprocal of the concentration index. Accordingly, 
Heyndels and Smolders (1995, p. 131) observe that:  
It is clear that capturing the complexity of a tax system through a HK index 
and by manipulating the α parameter, different relative weights can be 
given to the number of taxes and to the size inequalities between the 
different taxes as components of tax fragmentation. This creates the 
opportunity to determine the relative importance of both elements on an 
empirical basis. 
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The conventional approach to the analysis of fiscal illusion follows the Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) demand function for public goods which hypothesises that the level of 
expenditure conforms to the median voter model. The selection of local public goods to 
evaluate fiscal illusion within this approach is appropriate for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, "... an adequate amount of statistical information is an obvious sine qua non for 
demand estimation" (Wildasin 1989, p. 355).  Australia offers little in the way of 
governmental diversity at the state level, whilst analysis nationally requires detailed and 
standardised time-series data over substantial time-periods.  Secondly, expenditures at 
the local level are most likely to adhere to the classical unidimensional assumptions of 
the median voter model:  that is, whilst at state and national level various requirements 
such as welfare and defence must be "juggled", the provision of public goods at the 
local level is usually confined to more narrowly defined projects such as roads, parks 
and sanitation (Romer and Rosenthal 1979, p. 146). Thirdly, objective measures of 
public good performance and alternatives are less difficult to quantify (Romer and 
Rosenthal, 1979).  The cost or benefit of better local roads is surely more recognisable, 
to both the median voter and the administration, than decisions at a higher level of 
federal structure.  Finally, and most importantly in terms of the median voter model, the 
local community is more likely to adhere to the implicit assumptions of homogeneity 
(Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Romer and Rosenthal 1979; Holcombe 1980; Wildasin 
1989).  Thus, if a demand function is to be estimated on the basis of socio-economic 
variables alone, without the benefit of individual utility functions, some restrictions 
must be made.  For instance, the assumption that voters of a particular income class 
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have particular elasticities of demand would appear to hold better at the local level than 
at that of the relatively heterogenous state level (Wildasin, 1979). 
Modelling fiscal illusion in this manner is not only consistent with literature on the 
nature of the demand function for public goods, like Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) 
and Romer and Rosenthal (1979), but also accords with most previous empirical work 
on fiscal illusion, such as Wagner (1976), Munley and Greene (1978), Breeden and 
Hunter (1985), Feenburg and Rosen (1987) and Grossman (1990). Moreover, this 
methodology has dominated the empirical literature on fiscal illusion at the local level 
(Wagner 1976; Pommerehne and Schneider 1978; Munley and Greene 1978; 
DiLorenzo 1982; Grossman 1990; Heyndels and Smolders 1994). Furthermore, a log-
linear formulation of a per capita approach has been widely employed [see, for 
example, Baker (1983), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Heyndels and Smolders (1995)] 
Although the hypotheses examined in the present context are primarily concerned 
with the revenue complexity hypothesis, some consideration is also given to the renter 
illusion hypothesis since neglecting it would lead to misspecification (Martinez-
Vasquez 1983). The renter illusion hypothesis argues that " ...other things being equal, 
jurisdictions with a relatively large fraction of renters tend to spend more per capita on 
local public services" (Oates 1988, p. 72).  Such an observation is based on the apparent 
failure of renters to understand the link between the level of local services demanded 
and the level of rent paid (Oates 1988, p. 72).3 
Table 1 outlines the variables employed in the cross-sectional analysis of a sample 
of forty six local government areas in Tasmania, Australia. The estimating equation is: 
 lnEXPi = β0 + β1lnAREAi + β2lnROADi + β3lnTAXi +  
  β4lnOWNi + β5lnINCi + β7lnO65i + β8lnHi(α) + ui   (3)   
The dependent variable in (3) is per capita local government expenditure EXP. 
However, while this is the only broad measure of public good provision employed in 
past empirical studies (Wagner 1976; Baker 1983; Grossman 1990; Heyndels and 
Smolders 1994), at least two caveats should be attached to its use, both of which stem 
from the fact that the use of expenditure data implies that output is measured by the 
value of inputs.4 Firstly, the employment of expenditure as a proxy for public good 
provision necessarily assumes that production functions are uniform across 
jurisdictions. Hamilton (1983) has shown that community “inputs” may significantly 
modify the output of public goods, and accordingly misspecification of output may be a 
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problem. And secondly, EXP is based on constant returns to scale. Notwithstanding 
these caveats, and given the absence of more suitable dependent variables, we use 
EXP.5 
TABLE 1.  
Variable specification 
Table 1 also contains the set of independent socioeconomic variables required by the 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) demand function approach. These variables seek to 
capture salient characteristics of the local community that are likely to influence the 
demand for public good expenditure. Both rateable area per capita AREA and rateable 
area roads per capita ROAD are expected to exhibit a positive coefficient with respect 
to expenditure (Wagner 1976; Munley and Greene 1978), particularly since local 
governments in Australia typically devote considerable resources to these purposes.6 
The proportion of the population over sixty five years of age 065 is expected to yield a 
positive sign since a higher proportion of elderly people should be associated with a 
greater consumption of public goods (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973). Median voter 
Variables Details Data Source Coefficient 
EXP Total local per capita 
expenditure in the i-th 
municipality ($) 
Government Finance Statistics: Tasmania 
1990/1991 (ABS) Cat. 5501.6 
 
 
AREA Rateable area per 
capita of the i-th 
municipality (km2) 
Tasmanian Inquiry into the Modernisation 
of Local Government (LGAB), 1991. 
+ 
ROAD Road length per capita 
of the i-th 
municipality (km) 
Tasmanian Inquiry into the Modernisation 
of Local Government (LGAB), 1991. 
+ 
TAX Median voter tax-
price of the i-th 
municipality ($). 
Tasmanian Inquiry into the Modernisation 
of Local Government (LGAB) Tasmanian 
Government Gazette Vol. 275, 1991. 
Government Finance Statistics: Tasmania 
1990/1991 (ABS), Cat. 5501.6 
- 
OWN Proportion of homes 
owned in the i-th 
municipality  
Local Government Areas: Tasmania 1991 
Census (ABS) Cat. 2790.6 
- 
INC Median voter income 
in the i-th 
municipality ($) 
Local Government Areas: Tasmania 1991 
Census (ABS), Cat. 2790.6 
+ 
O65 Proportion of 
population over 65 in 
the i-th municipality  
Local Government Areas: Tasmania 1991 
Census (ABS), Cat. 2790.6 
+ 
HK 
(0 ≤ α < ∞) 
Hannah and Kay 
revenue concentration 
index for the i-th 
municipality. 
Government Finance Statistics: Tasmania 
1990/1991 (ABS), Cat. 5501.6 
+ 
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income INC is included on the presumption that public goods in general may be defined 
as normal goods, and on the assumption that it captures unmeasurable and 
unintentionally excluded income-correlated characteristics like educational attainment, 
employment, family stability, and “… general success in society” (Hamilton 1983, p. 
347). The expected coefficient for INC is positive. Despite the widespread employment 
of an income variable in the empirical literature, at least two lines of criticism have 
been directed at its use. Firstly, it is argued the employment of median measures of 
income may serve to obscure the real income elasticity of demand for the public good, 
since there is no reason to believe that elasticities are constant across a particular 
income class for any jurisdiction (Romer and Rosenthal 1979; Wildasin 1988). And 
secondly, the median voter model assumes that the median taxpayer receives the 
median income which amounts to assuming income is monotonic. If this is not the case, 
then the equation may be misspecified (Romer and Rosenthal 1979). However, 
Wildasin (1988, p. 375) argues that at the “macro-level” (ie. full local expenditure) the 
impact of any median voter model constraints and assumed monotonicity will be 
minimal, given “…the error in the income elasticity … is not likely to be very large.” 
The final independent socioeconomic variable is the tax-price TAX. In common with 
virtually all public good demand function studies since Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973), the tax-price of the median voter should ex ante inversely determine the level of 
provision of the public good, given the substitution from the public to the private good. 
However, two problems usually surround the selection of a suitable tax-price. The first 
is the conflict between mean and median tax-prices. Most work has employed the 
median voter approach, since the mean tax-price has been shown to involve substantial 
multicollinearity (Munley and Greene 1978; Pommerehne 1978) and to violate the 
assumptions of the primary model of collective choice (Romer and Rosenthal 1979, p. 
151). The second conflict revolves around the question of whether the relevant median 
tax-price is the median voter’s tax times the marginal cost of public good provision 
(Yinger, 1982), the median voter’s tax times the marginal cost of public good provision 
(Yinger 1982), the median voter’s tax-share (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) or an 
equal share of the additional provision of the public good (Borcherding 1985). Work by 
Hayes (1989) has argued that the median voter’s tax share is the most appropriate, both 
theoretically and empirically. After examining all three approaches, Hayes (1989, p. 
273) found that the median voter’s tax share displayed “small biases” for most 
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socioeconomic variables and provided better estimates given “… a possible 
misspecified production function,” as against the alternative approaches which 
exhibited “inconsistent parameters”. Hayes (1989, p. 273) observed that the results 
indicated “… statistical support for the median voter’s tax-share approach”.7 
Accordingly, this approach is employed in the present context. 
In addition to these socioeconomic variables, past empirical approaches to the 
analysis of fiscal illusion have included various illusionary factors. Variables selected 
in this regard depend critically on the powers and institutional processes of particular 
levels of government. The local level of government expenditure in Australia, as 
exemplified in our Tasmanian sample, provides a suitable milieu for the analysis of 
both the revenue-complexity hypotheses and the renter illusion hypothesis. As detailed 
earlier, the HHC has traditionally been used to test the tax complexity hypothesis. 
However, following Heyndels and Smolders’ (1995) pioneering paper, we employ the 
HK measure, with the weighting variable α ranging from zero to infinity, step 0.1.8 
Moreover, in common with Heyndels and Smolders (1995), the relative importance of 
the “number” and “size” components of revenue complexity is assessed by varying the 
value of α, and optimising with respect to the value of the coefficient of determination.9 
Secondly, the renter illusion hypothesis argues that “… other things being equal, 
jurisdictions with a relatively large fraction of renters tend to spend more per capita on 
local public service” (Oates 1988, p. 72). Such an observation is based on apparent 
failure of renters to understand the link between the level of local services demanded 
and the level of rent paid (Oates, 1988). The variable used to evaluate the renter illusion 
hypothesis OWN is the proportion of homes owned or being purchased in the 
municipality (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Goetz 1977; Martinez-Vazquez 1983). 
The renter illusion hypothesis would a priori indicate a negative coefficient since as the 
proportion of homes owned or being purchased increases, the level of expenditure 
would fall. 
IV. RESULTS 
Regression results for the models and hypotheses developed above are presented in 
Table 3. Selected descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
All socioeconomic and fiscal variables adhere to their hypothesised coefficients and 
would appear to support the considerable evidence that already exists “… suggesting 
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that the composition of the community - that is, the characteristics of the residents 
themselves - plays a central role in determining levels of important public outputs” 
(Schwab and Oates 1991, p. 217). Tests for homoskedasticity fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and we may conclude heteroskedasticity is not present. The Ramsay RESET 
specification test rejects the null hypothesis of no functional misspecification, whilst a 
test for model selection favours the log-linear form over an alternative linear 
formulation. The results supporting the former specification sustain the findings of 
Baker (1983), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Grossman (1990) and Heyndels and 
Smolders (1994; 1995) in the econometric suitability of the log-linear over a linear 
form for demand estimation. 
TABLE 2. 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AREA 608.07 476.35 8.00 1992.00 
ROADS 287.41 148.27 13.64 769.76 
TAX 700.25 235.76 130.23 1112.30 
OWN 0.68 0.11 0.14 0.81 
INC 26760.00 4604.20 17670.00 37790.00 
O65 0.116 0.031 0.014 0.167 
POPULATION 9829.90 13937.00 448.00 62504.00 
Most importantly in terms of the present study, the results in Table 3 suggest that the 
use of the HHC in analysis of this kind may involve sizeable misspecification bias. 
More particularly, the best fit of the model is optimised at an α value of 1.1.10 Utilising 
an F-test Wald procedure along the lines of Heyndels and Smolders (1995), the null 
hypothesis of the α = 2 restriction is rejected against the unrestricted α = 1.1 
alternative. 
This would tend to suggest that when the “artificial” restriction of α = 2 is imposed 
by the HHC, the size inequalities of different revenue extraction devices are 
emphasised over the number of such devices. This accords with Heyndels and 
Smolders (1995, p. 136) observation that “… the impact of the information of the fiscal 
burden being dispersed over different taxes is relatively underestimated, while the 
impact of Wagner’s ‘abstraction’-argument is relatively overestimated”. Moreover, and 
once again in agreement with Heyndels and Smolders (1995), the testing of a range of 
α values finds that consideration of the number and size of fiscal extraction devices is 
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required in the empirical analysis of revenue complexity. However, the results would 
suggest, at least in the Australian institutional milieu, that the emphasis on the size 
inequalities of revenue devices (as represented by the HHC) is likely to encompass a 
lesser degree of misspecification than that posited by the use of a proxy variable which 
might emphasise the number of such devices. Finally, further tests are undertaken using 
the preferred specification of  α = 1.1. A test for the joint insignificance of the vector of 
socioeconomic coefficiencts (AREA, ROAD, TAX, INC and O65) is rejected at the 99 
percent level. Similarly, an identical test for the joint insignificance of the illusionary 
variables OWN and HK is also rejected.  
TABLE 2.  
Regression Estimates 
  CONS. AREA ROAD TAX OWN INC O65 HK 
α = 0.0 3.0143 
(4.620) 
-0.1566* 
(0.078) 
0.4345** 
(0.134) 
-0.1939 
(0.133) 
-1.0299*** 
(0.308) 
0.1790 
(0.433) 
0.3485** 
(0.156) 
0.1229 
(0.640) 
α = 1.1 1.7213 
(4.060) 
-0.1771** 
(0.074) 
0.4557***
(0.127) 
-0.2447* 
(0.126) 
-1.1302*** 
(0.289) 
0.3099*** 
(0.405) 
0.3911* 
(0.138) 
0.6184* 
(0.315) 
α = 2.0 1.9516 
(4.095) 
-0.1631* 
(0.074) 
0.4210***
(0.128) 
-0.2143 
(0.124) 
-1.0828*** 
(0.288) 
0.2174 
(0.407) 
0.3899** 
(0.140) 
0.4825*** 
(0.278) 
α = ∞ 2.4927 
(4.251) 
-0.1487** 
(0.077) 
0.4018***
(0.135) 
-0.1825 
(0.127) 
-1.0275*** 
(0.294) 
0.2119 
(0.417) 
0.3681** 
(0.145) 
0.2843 
(0.324) 
Values in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. Asterisks represent the level of significance * 
- 90 percent, ** - 95 percent, *** - 99 percent. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Various benefits flow from the present study. Our results support the contention 
advanced by Heyndels and Smolders (1995) that the widespread use of the HHC may 
result in misspecification bias by providing corroborative econometric evidence drawn 
from an alternative institutional milieu and a different data set. There is thus now 
compelling evidence to suggest that the previous unqualified acceptance of the HHC as 
a satisfactory measure of revenue simplicity was misplaced. Moreover, our results also 
provide support for the use of the HK instead of the HHC. 
However, several caveats must be emphasised. In the first instance, whilst use of the 
HHC does lead to misspecification, the level of such misspecification is not great, at 
least relative to larger potential problems, such as overall model misspecification. 
Secondly, it should be noted that local governments in Australia are much more 
legislatively restricted in their revenue-raising activities than their Belgian 
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counterparts, and in particular are obliged to rely on far fewer fiscal extraction devices. 
It is thus reasonable to assume any HHC bias against the numbers of taxes is muted in 
the Australian context. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, despite its undoubted 
advantages Heyndels and Smolders (1995) seminal use of the HK does raise questions 
concerning “data mining”. The selection of an optimising value for α serves to 
maximise the ex post empirical results at the expense of sound a priori reasoning. The 
importance of a solid theoretical basis for the analysis of fiscal illusion need hardly be 
stressed. 
 
NOTES 
1  Other hypothesised sources of fiscal illusion are revenue-elasticity, the flypaper effect, renter illusion, 
and debt illusion.  
2  Municipal data was selected from Tasmania for three reasons.  The first is that Tasmania does not 
have in force "rate ceilings" as found in, say NSW.  Municipal decisions on expenditure thus tend to 
be more disassociated from state control.  Secondly, it would be unwise to cross state borders in 
selecting data sets, as substantial differences in the regulation, revenue raising and administration of 
local governments exist.  Thirdly, Tasmania was the only state to provide concise published data on a 
local government basis for the 1991 Australian Census. 
3  At the local level in Australia, revenue is primarily derived from municipal rates and the usage of 
municipal services and does not relate directly to income levels within a municipal area.  
Accordingly, the revenue-elasticity hypothesis is not relevant. 
4 Derivation of more suitable measures of public provision brings with it further complications.  In US 
studies of local education expenditure (Hamilton 1983), use of educational performance is more 
likely to be an indicator of the socio-economic profile of the community rather than public good 
demand.  In this manner, expenditure as output removes, at the least, the question of endogeneity 
(Wildasin 1989, p. 359). 
5  Some studies have argued convincingly that substantial variation in public good demand may be 
found within local expenditure.  In this manner evaluation of total local public goods may well 
obscure some of the peculiar conditions surrounding components of this expenditure, such as police, 
health and education in the United States (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Martinez-Vazquez 1983; 
Grossman 1990). 
6  Rateable area and rateable area roads, rather than municipal area and municipal area roads, were 
selected since many Tasmanian LGAs encompass sizeable wilderness (state-funded) and national 
park (federally funded) regions.  Rateable area and rateable area roads are likely to give a more 
accurate indication of local fiscal responsibilities. 
7  Flowers (1977) has argued that voter equilibrium with two or more tax sources requires the median 
voter to be identified for each tax source being utilised., rather than a single tax-price across all tax 
sources. 
8  It should be noted that Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) did raise the possibility of employing an 
entropy measure instead of the HHC, but did not report the empirical results flowing from its use, 
save to point out that it generated similar results to the conventional HHC. Similarly, Clotfelter 
(1976) included the relative importance of direct taxes and reliance on user charges in addition to an 
HHC comprising nine categories of taxation. For a detailed discussion of empirical work in the 
Wagner (1976) tradition see Dollery and Worthington (1996). 
9  Eight revenue classifications are employed; rates, licenses/fees/fines, grants, charges, interest, utility 
transfers, loans, and other income. 
10  By way of comparison, Heyndels and Smolders (1955, pp. 136) found best fit at an α value of 0.9. 
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